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A BROKEN SHIELD: A PLEA FOR FORMALITY IN THE 
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
Robin Walker Sterling* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The juvenile justice system swallows children of color at a 
shockingly disproportionate rate. The data is uncontroverted and bears 
repeating. In 2008, children of color comprised 22% of the country’s 
youth population, but constituted 54% of children arrested for violent 
crimes and 35% of children arrested for property crimes.
1
 When a 
white juvenile and a black juvenile with similar backgrounds are each 
charged with the same drug offense, the black juvenile is nine times 
more likely to be detained.
2
 Finally, one in three black juveniles can 
expect to go to prison in his lifetime.
3
 
 Explanations focusing on demographics, arrest rates, and rates 
of offending fail to account for the disparity.
4
 Moreover, data gathered 
using modern self-report methods
5
 suggest that the rates of juvenile 
drug offending are static across races. This conclusion undermines the 
hypothesis that African American children are more involved with the 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; J.D., New York 
University School of Law; B.A., Yale College. Former staff attorney with the Public 
Defender Services for the District of Columbia; supervising attorney at the 
Children’s Law Center; special counsel with the National Juvenile Defender Center 
in Washington D.C. 
1
 CRYSTAL KNOLL & MELISSA SICKMUND, Delinquency Cases in Juvenile Court, 
2008, Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention Fact Sheet, 2 (Dec. 
2011), available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/236479.pdf.  In 2008, white youth 
accounted for 78% of the U.S. juvenile population, black youth 16%, Asian youth 
(including Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander) 5%, and American Indian 
youth (including Alaska Native) 1%. Id. 
2
 W. Haywood Burns Inst. for Juvenile Justice Fairness and Equity, 
Disproportionate Minority Confinement/Contact (DMC), 
http://www.burnsinstitute.org/downloads/FACT%20SHEET%20BI.doc (last visited 
Oct. 13, 2013). 
3
 Id. 
4
 Robin Walker Sterling, Fundamental Unfairness: In Re Gault and the Road Not 
Taken, 72 MD. L. REV. 607, 661 (2013) (arguing that rates of offending are static 
across racial and ethnic groups and that it is more likely that the acknowledged 
conscious and unconscious bias account for the disproportionate minority contact). 
5
 Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in Communities of 
Color: The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 
383, 415 (2013) (detailing modern methods that ensure that self-report surveys are 
“as reliable, if not more reliable than, most social science measures”). 
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juvenile justice system simply because they commit a disproportionate 
share of crimes.
6
  
 A probable explanation is conscious and unconscious bias.
7
 
This bias takes hold at all points of discretion in the juvenile justice 
system.
8
 As one noted scholar wrote, “individualized discretion is 
often synonymous with racial disparities in sentencing.”9 The numbers 
reinforce this belief. Between 2002 and 2004, black juveniles—16% 
of the youth population — had the misfortune of accounting for 28% 
of juvenile arrests, 30% of court referrals, 37% of detained youth, 38% 
of youth placed out of their home, 34% of youth waived to adult court, 
and 58% of youth locked in adult prisons.
10
 
 The juvenile justice system poses a singular threat to children 
of color because the juvenile justice procedure lacks formality. In the 
place of formality is discretion, and every point of discretion functions 
as another foothold for implicit bias. This informality is enshrined in 
Supreme Court doctrine that was built on the late-nineteenth century 
“Child Savers” narrative. The “Child Savers” founded the early 
juvenile court according to rehabilitative principles of “fairness, of 
concern, of sympathy, and of paternal attention.”11 This dominant 
narrative informed the Court’s decision in In re Gault.12 In re Gault 
grounded the procedural rights of juvenile defendants in the 
                                                 
6
 See id. at 414–15 (arguing that there is a disparity between self-reported drug use 
and drug arrests for African American and Hispanic children, which could be 
explained by “increased police presence” in their neighborhoods and communities, 
as well as police racial and ethnic bias). 
7
 See generally Geoff Ward, Aaron Kupchik, Laurin Parker & Brian Chad Starks, 
Racial Politics of Juvenile Justice Policy Support: Juvenile Court Worker 
Orientations Toward Disproportionate Minority Confinement, RACE & JUSTICE, 154, 
158–59, 175 (2011) ( noting studies showing white probation officers were more 
likely to make “negative internal attributions about Black youth delinquency,” and 
explaining their studies findings that race effects are relevant to differential treatment 
within the juvenile justice system). 
8
 Walker Sterling, supra note 4, at 661. 
9
 Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 
714. 
10
 Katayoon Majd, Students of the Mass Incarceration Nation, 54 HOW. L.J. 343, 360 
(2011). 
11
 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971). 
12
 387 U.S. 1, 14-19 (1967) (discussing the history of the Child Savers movement 
and the refusal to grant juveniles the same rights as adults in criminal proceedings 
because children were viewed as innocent and incarcerating them with adults did not 
rehabilitate or protect them, which is what they believed should have been 
happening). 
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minimalistic due process concept of “fundamental fairness” rather than 
in the full fundamental rights afforded to adult criminal defendants 
under the United States Constitution.
13
 
 Uncritically relying on the Child Savers narrative suppresses 
the alternative narrative detailing the experience of children of color.
14
 
Had the Court recognized this alternative narrative, the Court might 
have seen that people of color did not experience “disillusionment”15 
by the juvenile justice system at some point long ago; the Court would 
have found that there was no such illusion to begin with. People of 
color have received “the worst of both worlds”—a lack of 
rehabilitative treatment and a lack of procedural protections—since the 
start of the juvenile justice system.
16
 
 Gault, along with the other juvenile cases from the Warren 
Court, is widely considered to be the apex of the juvenile due process 
movement. Gault was the first case to extend many procedural rights 
to juveniles, not least among them the right to counsel, by grounding 
those rights in the limited doctrine of fundamental fairness.
 17
  But 
Gault also splintered juvenile justice from the rest of the civil rights 
movement and stunted its growth. The ramifications of this became all 
too apparent in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, in which the Court refused 
to recognize a juvenile right to trial by jury as part of the fundamental 
                                                 
13
 Walker Sterling, supra note 4, at 646 (in an effort to maintain certain benefits of 
the juvenile proceedings such as “confidentiality and rehabilitative services” the 
Court in In re Gault refused to determine “that juvenile delinquency proceedings 
were completely analogous to criminal trials,” thus expanding the Fourteenth 
Amendment fundamental fairness balancing test as opposed to “the same 
constitutional protections that check the government’s power in [adult] criminal 
proceedings.”). 
14
 See generally Walker Sterling, supra note 4, Part IB (claiming children of color 
were excluded from rehabilitative services, had fewer resources, and experienced 
disproportionate contact with the justice system because of “racist attitudes towards 
black children and their capabilities” ). 
15
 See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 551 (the ultimate disillusionment occurs when 
superimposing the criminal adjudicative process on the juvenile court system, 
thereby eliminating the need for the juvenile court system if it is equivalent to the 
adult system). 
16
 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.  541, 556 (1966). 
17
 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21, 29–31 (1967) (holding juveniles are guaranteed similar 
protections given to adults in criminal proceedings in accordance with Due Process 
rights). 
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fairness rubric.
18
 This holding has had disastrous implications for 
children of color, who require procedural formalities as a shield 
against the discriminatory impact of unfettered discretion.
19
 
 I previously discussed the topic of Gault’s failings in 
Fundamental Unfairness.
20
 The purpose of this brief piece, written as 
a companion to a talk I delivered at the University of Maryland 
“Children at Risk” Symposium on November 9, 2012, is to expound 
further on this topic. The past several terms demonstrate that the 
Supreme Court has the constitutional rights of children accused of 
crimes in sight.
21
 This opportunity to push for a realignment of 
juvenile justice toward a full recognition of fundamental rights must 
not be wasted. The need is urgent and the time is ripe. 
 Part I briefly reiterates the history of the juvenile justice 
system, contrasting the dominant narrative of a progressive, 
rehabilitative system with the true experience of children of color. 
With that context set, I outline the major doctrines set forth in Gault 
and the related juvenile cases of its era. I then go further than I did in 
Fundamental Unfairness and discuss how the experiences of white 
and minority youths continued to diverge after McKeiver. In Part II, I 
explain how Gault and its progeny have left children of color exposed 
to the implicit racial bias that permeates the system. Finally, in Part 
III, I prescribe strategies to begin the overdue dismantling of the 
machinery that imprisons, stigmatizes, and damages the lives of 
children of color at a grossly disproportionate rate. 
 
 
                                                 
18
 McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543–45. (holding a “jury is [not] a necessary component of 
accurate fact finding,” and the juvenile standard of fundamental fairness does not 
require one).  
19
 Id. at 528. 
20
 See generally Walker Sterling, supra note 4, Part II (arguing the Court’s failure to 
note the disparate treatment of minority juveniles in the In re Gault decision led to 
their flawed reasoning for basing their decision in the Fourteenth Amendment as 
opposed to the Bill of Rights). 
21
 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that the execution of a 
juvenile offender younger than 18 years of age at the time of the commission of a 
capital offense violated the Eighth Amendment); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 
2011, 2033–34 (2010) (holding that the imposition of life without the possibility of 
parole not guilty of homicide violates the Eighth Amendment); Miller v. Alabama, 
132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) (holding that mandatory life without the possibility of 
parole for those who were under 18 at the commission of their crime violates the 
Eighth Amendment). 
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I. HOW WE GOT HERE: HISTORY AND DOCTRINE 
   
The racial history of the juvenile justice system and the 
Supreme Court’s misstep in Gault work together to create a system 
that is hostile and discriminatory towards children of color.
22
 The 
legacies of slavery, Jim Crow, and the modern criminal justice system 
have embedded stereotypes and bias deeply into the American 
consciousness.
23
 The doctrinal underpinnings of the juvenile justice 
system create discretion points at which these lurking racial 
assumptions can express themselves in the form of harsher punishment 
for children of color. This exposure to arbitrary treatment is disguised 
in the sheep’s clothing of an informal, rehabilitative process.  
 
A. Origins of the Juvenile Court 
 
 I begin with the juvenile court’s origins.24 Examining the 
history of the juvenile court provides insight into the evolution of the 
doctrine upon which modern-day juvenile jurisprudence rests. One 
strand woven into this account is the well-known narrative of the 
Child Savers’ campaign for a specialized juvenile court. It is on this 
narrative that the Supreme Court would build a jurisprudence that 
denies juvenile defendants refuge in the criminal procedure 
amendments of the Bill of Rights.
25
 Justice Harlan instead nested 
juvenile due process rights on the weaker footing of “fundamental 
fairness.”26 Parallel to this narrative, I excavate the much-ignored but 
                                                 
22
 See discussion infra Parts I. and II. 
23
James Bell & Laura John Ridolfi, Adoration of the Question: Reflections on the 
Failure to Reduce Racial and Ethnic Disparities in the Juvenile Justice System, W. 
Haywood Burns Institute, 8 (Dec. 2008), available at 
http://www.burnsinstitute.org/downloads/BI%20Adoration%20of%20the%20Questi
on_2.pdf (noting historically unequal treatment was blatant and intentional resulting 
in harsh conditions for juveniles of color, while comparing current juvenile polices 
and finding that while they are race-neutral they have a discriminatory effect that we 
have embraced by it being unchanged). 
24
 See generally Sanford Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 
STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1188–92 (stating a call for the “rescue of children from future 
crime and degradation” began a movement to discipline children who were on a path 
to criminal conduct). 
25
 See generally Walker Sterling, supra note 4, Part II. 
26
See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966) (holding that due process 
requirements apply to transfer proceedings);  Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 59–60, 12  
(1965)(holding that juveniles have right to notice of charges, right to counsel, 
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all too real narrative of children of color in the juvenile justice system. 
It is this narrative for which later doctrinal developments would fail to 
account, thus embedding disproportionate minority contact (DMC) 
into the juvenile justice system.
27
 
 The precursors to the juvenile court system were the Houses of 
Refuge.
28
 In 1824, the New York legislature granted the Society for 
the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents the authority to build the 
New York House of Refuge, which opened in 1825.
29
 The House of 
Refuge’s purpose was to “offer food, shelter, and education to the 
homeless and destitute youth of New York, by and removing juvenile 
offenders from the prison company of adult convicts[.]”30 By the terms 
of its charter, only “proper objects” could be admitted to the House of 
Refuge.
31
 “Proper objects” were generally poor white boys who were 
deemed amenable to being saved from future criminality by residence 
in the House.
32
  
 Black children were not admitted to the New York House of 
refuge until 1834, reflecting racist attitudes regarding their 
salvageability.
33
 Once admitted, black children were nevertheless 
denied rehabilitation services to avoid “a waste of resources and a 
debasement of [w]hites.”34 Similar patterns emerged in houses of 
refuge opening elsewhere in the country. Philadelphia’s House of 
Refuge, while teaching white boys agriculture and academics, 
                                                                                                                   
privilege against self-incrimination, and right to confrontation and cross-examination 
in adjudicatory hearings in delinquency cases under the idea of “due process and 
fairness”); Id. at 76 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing 
“prudence and principles of the Fourteenth Amendment alike require that the Court 
should now impose no more procedural restrictions than are imperative to assure 
fundamental fairness…”); See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363, 368 (1970) 
(holding that fundamental fairness requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in 
delinquency adjudications). 
27
 Disproportionate Minority Contact, OJJDP IN FOCUS, Nov. 2012, at 1, available 
at http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/239457.pdf. 
28
 Sanford Fox, see supra note 24, at 1187. 
29
 Id. at 1187, 1189–90. 
30
 Id. at 1189.  
31
 Id.  at 1190 (“Only ‘proper objects’ were to be sent to the House, not every 
vagrant and criminal child”); See infra text accompanying note 32. 
32
 Id.; GEOFF K. WARD, THE BLACK CHILD-SAVERS: RACIAL DEMOCRACY AND 
JUVENILE JUSTICE 73 (2012) (noting poor white and immigrant European youths had 
access to reformatories first and even when accessed by black children they held 
“deep investments in white supremacist ideology”).  
33
 See Bell & Ridolfi supra note 23, at 3. 
34
 Id. 
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consigned black boys to perform manual labor, and black girls to 
vocational training as cooks, maids, and seamstresses.35 The impetus 
for segregation was so strong that black children were locked away in 
adult prisons in jurisdictions where houses of refuge only possessed 
facilities for white children.36 
 Houses of Refuge did not open in the South until 1847, and no 
reformatory for black youths existed in the South until 1873.
37
 A 
primary motivation for opening the first black youth reformatory, the 
Baltimore House of Reformation for Black Children, was “the need 
for agricultural labor through [the] State, as well as the great want of 
competent house servants” that arose once the South no longer had 
access to slaves as a source of labor.38 Convict leasing—the practice of 
leasing prisoners to private parties for forced labor—was widely used 
to draw black people and children back into slavery.
39
 Both black 
adults and black children were re-enslaved through the “convict labor 
machine.”40 
 In Chicago, Illinois in 1899, a group of progressive reformers 
known as the Child Savers successfully advocated for the creation of 
the nation’s first separate juvenile court.41 The Child Savers were 
animated by a “Rehabilitative Ideal” having three tenets: 1) children 
are capable of rehabilitation; 2) proper intervention is sufficient for 
rehabilitation, and; 3) rehabilitation was directed toward the end that 
                                                 
35
 WARD, supra note 32, at 57-60 (claiming white youth were taught while at the 
House of Refuge because they could assured of jobs upon release, whereas 
convincing black youth to study was absurd because they were going to end up a part 
of the servile pool and should instead be trained, not educated). 
36
 See Walker Sterling, supra note 4 at 624 (“in places that did not have separate 
black juvenile facilities, black youth were often placed in adult prisons instead of in 
white juvenile facilities with white youth”). 
37
 Id. at 625 (“Maryland opened the first and only southern reformatory for black 
youths in 1873, almost fifty years after the New York House of Refuge opened its 
doors”). 
38
 Id.; see also Cecile P. Frey, The House of Refuge for Colored Children, THE 
JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY  Spring, 1981, at 10, 17–18 (“noting that the Board of 
Managers of the House of Refuge for Colored Children in Philadelphia desired to 
send the black children to a small farm in the country so that they could learn 
agriculture and horticulture”). (citation omitted)  
39
 DAVID M. OSHINSKY, “WORSE THAN SLAVERY”: PARCHMAN FARM AND THE 
ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE, 37, 41–47 (1994). 
40
Id. at 40–42, 46–47. 
41
 See WARD supra note 32 (noting that Progressive Era reformers can be credited 
with developing the modern juvenile court, which is focused on preventing 
delinquency through rehabilitation).  
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“[a]ll Americans . . . become middle class Americans.”42 The Child 
Savers were focused on the assimilation of poor white and European 
immigrant youths.43 
 With its rehabilitative aim, the juvenile court “shun[ned] the 
burdensome formalities of criminal procedures,” like rules of evidence 
and jury trials.44 The informality was deemed conducive to 
rehabilitation.45 This vision of juvenile justice proved so popular that 
by 1925, juvenile courts had expanded to all but two states and 
inspired laws across Europe, South America, and Asia.46 
 Black children did not receive the benefit of the rehabilitative 
ideal. Unlike the poor, white, immigrant youth with whom white 
Americans felt an affinity, black people were not deemed amenable to 
rehabilitative efforts.47 Where white children received disproportionate 
rehabilitative resources, black children received whippings.48 Mass 
migration to the North in the early twentieth century did not spare 
black children from disproportionately harsh sanctions. In 1926, 
Detroit juvenile court complaints against black children were filed 
more than twice as often as such complaints were filed against white 
children.49 Between 1917 and 1928 in Detroit, black children 
accounted for 12% of the population in custody there even though they 
comprised merely 3.3% of the general population.50 Between 1900 and 
1959, 70% of executions of people age eighteen and younger in the 
United States were black.
51
 
 The narrative of progressive reform and individualized, 
                                                 
42
 Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension between Apprendi and McKeiver: 
Sentence Enhancements based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of 
Justice in Juvenile Courts, 38 WAKE FOR. L. REV. 1111, fn. 76 (2003). 
43
 WARD, supra note 32, at 87. 
44
 James E. Starrs, A Sense of Irony in Southern Juvenile Courts, 1 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 129, 134 (1966). 
45
 Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imaging Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: 
the Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1100 (1990).. 
46
 Tamar R. Brickhead, Delinquent by Reason of Poverty, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y, 53, 64 (2012). 
47
 See WARD, supra note 32, at 86–87. 
48
 See WARD, supra note 32, at 115. 
49
 DAVID B. WOLCOTT, COPS AND KIDS: POLICING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN 
URBAN AMERICA, 1890-1940 98 (2005).. 
50
 Id. 
51
 Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in Communities of 
Color: The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 
383, 407 (2013). 
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rehabilitative treatment in the juvenile justice system did not apply to 
black children. The rehabilitative function of the juvenile courts was 
envisioned as a means to integrate white immigrant youth into middle 
class American society.
52
 Black children, who did not fit into that 
paradigm, were subjected to social control through a quasi-criminal 
process that retained the punitive consequences of adult court yet 
lacked the formal protections afforded to adult defendants. 
 
B. Due Process Comes to Juvenile Court: In re Gault and McKeiver v. 
Pennsylvania 
 
 In re Gault concerned Gerald Gault, a minor who was arrested 
and taken into custody for making a lewd phone call to a neighbor.
53
 
One day later, a hearing was held in the judge’s chambers.54 The 
juvenile court judge questioned Gerald directly.
55
 Neither Gerald nor 
his parents received a copy of the petition to notify them of the 
specific allegations.56 No defense attorneys or witnesses were present, 
not even the witness to whom Gerald was alleged to have made the 
lewd call.57  After a second, similar hearing,58 Gerald was adjudicated 
delinquent and committed to the State Industrial School “for the period 
of his minority.”59 For fifteen-year-old Gerald, that meant six years.60 
 The United States Supreme Court could not abide such 
appallingly cursory procedure. In re Gault granted youths in 
delinquency proceedings the rights to counsel, notice, confrontation, 
and the privilege against compelled self-incrimination.61  
 Gault was handed down during a decade in which racial 
equality proved a dominant theme in Supreme Court jurisprudence.62 
                                                 
52
 See WARD, supra note 32 at 87. 
53
 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 4 (1967). 
54
 Id. at 4–5 
55
 Id. at 6. 
56
 Id. at 9. 
57
 Id. at 5. 
58
 Id. at 8. 
59
 Id. at 7. 
60
 Id. at 7–8. 
61
 Id. at 33, 41, 55–57. 
62
 Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas 
Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L. J. 1035, 1037 (1977); see also Barry C. Feld, The 
Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 1484, 1494 (1991) 
(discussing the Warren Court’s “perceived . . . need to protect . . . minority 
offenders” and desire to make its own contribution to the Civil Rights Movement by 
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During this era, the Court extended many federal rights to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, including the right to counsel in 
Gideon v. Wainwright.
63 However, Gault is distinct from its adult 
criminal procedural counterpart in that, rather than rooting the rights 
of juveniles in the Bill of Rights like it had for adult defendants,
64
 the 
Gault Court rested juvenile procedure on Fourteenth Amendment 
“fundamental fairness.”65 The most critical difference between these 
doctrinal routes is that, unlike “fundamental rights” under the Bill of 
Rights, “fundamental fairness” is subject to a balancing of equities.66 
Specifically, the balancing test at play in Gault involved weighing the 
value of a particular due process protection against the need for 
informality, flexibility, and efficiency of juvenile court hearings.
67
 
 This framing of the issue embraces the Child Savers’ origin 
story but ignores the actual experience of children of color. The Court 
recounted that the early reformers were “appalled by adult procedures 
and penalties, and by the fact that children could be given long prison 
sentences and mixed in jails with hardened criminals” and were 
“profoundly convinced that society's duty to the child could not be 
confined by the concept of justice alone.”68 The Court went so far as to 
say that the juvenile court was built upon “the highest motives and 
most enlightened impulses . . . .”69 Such rhetoric makes it unsurprising 
that the Court uncritically accepted the notion of a rehabilitative, non-
punitive juvenile court where the need for paternalistic informality and 
freedom from procedural trappings played a strong enough role that it 
could conceivably outweigh the due process protections afforded to 
adults in criminal court.
70
 
                                                                                                                   
“focus[ing] on procedural rights” as an answer to the country’s profound “concern 
about racial inequality”). 
63
 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963). 
64
 Id. 
65
 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
66
 Walker Sterling, supra note 4, at 640. 
67
 See Gault, 387 U.S. at 13–14 (“The problem is to ascertain the precise impact of 
the due process requirement upon such proceedings.”). 
68
 Gault, 387 U.S. at 15. 
69
 Id. at 17. 
70
 Compare Gault,  387 U.S  at 15 (“The early reformers were appalled by adult 
procedures and penalties . . . .”); and  Id. at 15–16 (“The apparent rigidities, 
technicalities, and harshness which [early reformers] observed in both substantive 
and procedural criminal law were therefore to be discarded. The idea of crime and 
punishment was to be abandoned. The child was to be ‘treated’ and ‘rehabilitated’ 
and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization, were to be 
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 The Gault Court blatantly ignored the fact that, for children of 
color, juvenile proceedings were criminal trials under a different name 
and that rehabilitative services were never provided evenly among the 
races.
71
 If the Court had been willing to confront that reality, it may 
have properly extended the full slate of fundamental criminal 
procedure rights to juvenile court.  
 Fundamental fairness and fundamental rights analyses lead to 
different outcomes. In Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court applied the 
Sixth Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment 
and found that, under a fundamental rights analysis, all adults charged 
with serious crimes were entitled to a trial by jury.
72
 On the other hand 
in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the Court employed the fundamental 
fairness analysis to find that juveniles in delinquency proceedings 
have no right to a trial by jury.
73
 
 McKeiver consolidated a relatively typical juvenile case from 
Pennsylvania
74
 with an extraordinary one from North Carolina.75 The 
North Carolina case, In re Burrus, concerned approximately 45 black 
schoolchildren, ages 11 to 15 years old, who were charged in juvenile 
court with willfully impeding traffic while gathering to protest their 
school district’s discriminatory policies.76 In both McKeiver and 
Burrus, the trial court denied the defense’s request for a jury trial and 
each of the children were found delinquent.77   
 Although the petitioner’s brief in Burrus underscored the 
case’s racial overtones, the Court practically ignored that aspect of the 
case.
78
 The McKeiver plurality deployed the amorphous Gault 
                                                                                                                   
‘clinical’ rather than punitive.”); with Id. at 22 (“the commendable principles relating 
to the processing and treatment of juveniles separately from adults  [under the idea 
of parens patrie] are in no way involved or affected by the procedural rights of 
[adult offenders]”).  
71
 Walker Sterling, supra note 4, at 627–628. 
72
 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). 
73
 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543, 545 (1971). 
74
 Id. at 534–536. 
75
 Id. at 536–37. 
76
 Id. at 536; see also In re Burrus, 167 S.E.2d 454, 457 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969). 
77
 McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 537. 
78
 Compare Burrus, 4 S.E.2d at 457 (calling the cases “a concentrated demonstration 
by Negroes of Hyde County to assert their defiance of law and order and to disrupt 
the normal economic and social life of Hyde County . . . .”), with Brief for Petitioner 
at 32, In re Burrus, 4 S.E.2d 454 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969), No. 128, 1970 WL 121988 
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balancing test, weighing various equities such as the importance of the 
interest at stake, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest 
because of the procedures used, the probable value of additional 
procedural safeguards, the adequacy of available substitutes for the 
requirement, costs, and other administrative concerns.79  Many of these 
considerations could not be considered under a fundamental rights 
approach, such as the substitute procedure of judicial fact-finding and 
the administrative burden of jury trials.80  
 Although the plurality paid lip service to the juvenile system’s 
failure to reach the rehabilitative ideal, it nevertheless refused to 
eschew the Child Savers narrative.
81
 Couching its rhetoric in the 
juvenile court’s ideal of “fairness, of concern, of sympathy, and of 
paternal attention,”82 and showing fear that the juvenile court might 
become a “fully adversary process,”83 the Court refused to succumb to 
“disillusionment” with basing the informal juvenile system on the 
ideal that youths are uniquely amenable to rehabilitation.
84
 
But people of color were already disillusioned. The Child 
Savers ideal that the Court embraced wholesale was a device to 
assimilate white immigrant youth, not to provide rehabilitative 
services to all children, regardless of color. The McKeiver Court stood 
willfully blind to the reality that children of color were not afforded 
“fairness, concern, sympathy, and paternal attention.”85 If the Court 
had confronted the radicalized nature of the case before it, the DMC 
landscape might look very different today.  
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C. The Experience after Gault–McKeiver 
 
 It took less than a decade after McKeiver for state courts to 
begin explicitly endorsing punitive goals in juvenile justice, contrary 
to McKeiver’s premise that juvenile proceedings were of a 
fundamentally different nature than criminal proceedings. For 
example, in State v. Lawly,
86
 the Supreme Court of Washington noted 
the possibility “that the accountability for criminal behavior, the prior 
criminal activity and punishment commensurate with age, crime and 
criminal history does as much to rehabilitate, correct and direct an 
errant youth as does the prior philosophy of focusing upon the 
particular characteristics of the individual juvenile.”87 In In re Seven 
Minors,
88
 the Supreme Court of Nevada opined that “[b]y formally 
recognizing the legitimacy of punitive and deterrent sanctions for 
criminal offenses[,] juvenile courts will be properly and somewhat 
belatedly expressing society's firm disapproval of juvenile crime and 
will be clearly issuing a threat of punishment for criminal acts to the 
juvenile population.”89  
 The 1990s saw a boom in juvenile punishment when 
politicians, the media, and academics began stoking moral panic with 
prognostication of an oncoming generation of juvenile “super–
predators.”90 The term “super–predator” was coined by Professor John 
DiIulio, who predicted a new breed of animalistic youngsters willing 
to “kill, rape, maim, and steal without remorse.”91 DiIulio’s 
predictions were explicitly racist, positing that “as many as half of 
these juvenile super-predators could be young black males” due to 
“moral poverty” in the black community.92 “My black crime problem, 
and ours,” opined DiIulio, “is that for most Americans, especially for 
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average white Americans, the distance is not merely great but almost 
unfathomable, the fear is enormous and largely justifiable, and the 
black kids who inspire the fear seem not merely unrecognizable but 
alien.”93  
 Although there was no actual increasing pattern of youth 
violence in the 1980s and 1990s,
94
 the perception flourished that 
violent attacks against white victims by youthful, nonwhite assailants 
were rampant.
95
 The rhetoric sparked a “get tough” response to 
juvenile delinquency.
96
 This new orientation toward juvenile 
punishment was targeted squarely at youth of color. Four out of every 
five new children detained in 1983 to 1987 were children of color.
97
 
There was a 41% overall increase in cases involving detained youth in 
the period from 1985 to 2008. For African American youth, this 
number increased to 85%.
98
 For white youth, incidents of detention 
increased only 19%.
99
 
 This war on youth also prompted massive increases in police 
presence in schools, disproportionately so in communities of color.
100
 
The proliferation of police on school grounds resulted in a more 
punitive approach to normal adolescent behavior.
101
 Where once 
school officials dealt with school misbehavior, children were 
increasingly confronted by school resource officers for even minor 
misconduct.
102
 The consequence was a spike in referrals of children 
from school to the juvenile justice system, which disproportionately 
syphoned students of color out of school and into court.
103
 In 
jurisdictions across geographic regions, African American children 
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were 2 to 3.5 times more likely than white children to be referred from 
school to the juvenile justice system.
104
 
 
II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF INFORMALITY 
  
 In light of the disparate experience of children of color in the 
juvenile justice system, the stunted framework for procedural rights 
under Gault poses a particularized threat to children of color. 
“Fundamental fairness” affords children of color inadequate protection 
against the implicit bias that pervades the juvenile system. Every 
procedural right withheld from children under the Gault rubric creates 
a pocket of discretion through which bias can seep into the system. 
 One unique way in which implicit bias affects children is that it 
influences the way adults perceive the inherent characteristics of 
adolescents. Adolescent development research finds that youth are 
more impetuous, susceptible to negative influence, and have a more 
difficult time weighing the consequences of their actions than 
adults.
105
 These characteristics of youth are stable across ethnicities.
106
 
However, a string of studies indicates that the intrinsic characteristics 
of youth are weighted differently by observers depending on the race 
of the child in question.  
First, a 1998 study of probation reports suggested that 
probation officers’ attribution of causes of crime to character traits of 
the defendant rather than external factors increased when the 
defendant was black, resulting in harsher recommended sentences.
107
 
Second, a pair of 2004 studies of police officers and probation officers 
found that the subjects were more likely to rate hypothetical child 
offenders as less immature, more morally culpable, and more 
deserving of punishment if the subjects were primed to believe that the 
child was African American.
108
 And third, a 2012 study concluded that 
members of the general population are more likely to attribute 
blameworthiness to a juvenile defendant when primed to believe the 
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defendant is black than they are if given the same set of facts 
pertaining to a white defendant.
109
 
 It appears that individuals, including key decision makers in 
the justice system, have a more difficult time viewing black youths as 
children who have all the diminished culpability attendant to minority, 
than they do white youths.
110
 The result is that black children are 
punished more and to a greater degree.
111
 
 The procedural protections that were withheld under the 
Gault–McKeiver line of cases could have been used to shield children 
against the threat of bias. For instance, the right to a public trial, 
explicitly rejected in McKeiver, would allow for more public 
accountability of courtroom actors and improved scrutiny of discretion 
exercises. Public trials play a role in reducing government oppression 
and corruption, especially in cases containing a racial dimension.
112
 In 
his McKeiver dissent,
113
 Justice Brennan acknowledged the racial 
nature of the Burrus facts and stated frankly that the case presented “a 
paradigm of the circumstances in which there may be a substantial 
‘temptation to use the courts for political ends.’”114  
 Of course, McKeiver also denied juveniles in delinquency 
proceedings the right to a jury trial, and the detrimental impact of that 
on children of color may be severe. Juries play many important 
functions beyond mere fact-finding. For instance, a jury may give 
more careful consideration to each case than would a judge who has 
seen similar cases countless times before.
115
 Thus, rather than relying 
on stereotypes formed through mass exposure and desensitization to 
juvenile defendants, juries can offer individualized attention to each 
individual child. Furthermore, judges are exposed to facts such as 
suppressed evidence and the juvenile respondent’s prior record 
throughout the proceedings, increasing the risk that an impermissible 
inference will be made, consciously or subconsciously, in the course 
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of adjudication.
116
 As a consequence of its embrace of the Child 
Savers narrative and refusal to consider the experience of children of 
color, the McKeiver plurality brushed aside these concerns on the 
ground that they were arguments better directed at criminal 
proceedings and ignored the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile 
system.
117
  
 Another drawback to denying juveniles a jury right is that 
procedural informality may actually hinder the rehabilitative process 
by decreasing youth confidence in the fairness of the juvenile justice 
system. 
118
 Juvenile respondents have a better perception of juvenile 
proceedings when a jury is involved.
119
 Failure to provide the 
trappings of a formal process causes confusion and resentment in 
juvenile respondents.
120
 This effect is especially pronounced in 
nonwhite juvenile respondents.
121
 Gault itself cited a study warning 
that when children perceive lax procedural protections they may be 
more likely to resist rehabilitative efforts.
122
 By using lenient 
procedures, we are hindering the rehabilitative task by communicating 
to children that the process is unfair and that there is no value in 
participating in it. 
 The unfairness is compounded in sentencing outcomes. 
Juvenile convictions are not just used to determine the punishment of 
the present charge, but may also be used to increase penalties for later 
convictions.
123
 Much of the racial disparity in juvenile sentencing that 
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is not explained through racial bias is accounted for by differences in 
prior records.
124
 But when one considers that those prior records were 
themselves likely tainted by racially biased juvenile proceedings in 
which the respondent was not afforded his or her full fundamental 
rights, the power of that rationalization loses its luster.  
 Finally, withholding juries deprives juvenile respondents of the 
potential to benefit from jury nullification when a law is unjust or is 
applied unjustly to that particular youth. Jury nullification refers to a 
jury’s ability to acquit the accused based on equities rather than the 
legal elements of the crime.
125
 Jury nullification takes on a particularly 
important role when the criminal law intersects with race. Jury 
nullification was, for instance, used to allow violators of the Fugitive 
Slave Act to circumvent conviction.
126
 Furthermore, Paul Butler 
famously advocated for black jurors to nullify convictions against 
certain nonviolent black defendants.
127
 Butler’s premise is that black 
jurors may rationally find that the social cost of removing one of their 
own from the community and into prison outweighs the law 
enforcement interest in reaching a verdict of guilty.
128
 In the same 
way, a jury should have the opportunity to decide whether removing a 
child from the positive influences of the community and placing that 
child into a state institution imposes higher costs than benefits. 
 
III. SOLUTIONS 
 
 One necessary solution would be for the Supreme Court to 
augment Gault’s “fundamental fairness” protections with the full 
protections of the Bill of Rights. Gideon accomplished a similar task 
in the adult context when it applied the Sixth Amendment to broaden 
the right to counsel on top of the Fourteenth Amendment due process 
right to counsel in capital cases upheld under Powell v. Alabama.
129
 
 However, it would be naive to believe that this first step would 
accomplish racial parity in the juvenile justice system. After all, the 
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adult racial disparities in the criminal justice system survive despite 
the recognition of fundamental rights.
130
 
Part of the responsibility falls in the lap of defense attorneys. 
Through first hand experience, defense attorneys are the actors in the 
court system most aware of the problem of DMC. It affects our clients 
on a daily basis. Because defense attorneys have a duty to advocate for 
the stated interest of their clients, they are the actors in the court 
system with the strongest motivation and the best position to push for 
a change. There are several tactics defense attorneys can use to bring 
race into open discussion so that the narrative of people of color will 
no longer be subsumed. These tactics are as applicable in juvenile 
court as they are in the broader criminal system. 
 First, defense attorneys should engage in local data collection. 
Ideally, the public defenders office should track the race of every 
defendant that comes through their office and the decisions made by 
court actors at every discretion point. It is much easier to raise the 
issue of race to the court with statistical backing than with hunch-
based accusations. Second, defense attorneys should also participate to 
whatever extent possible in governmental DMC task forces so that the 
perspective of the defendant can have weight in these bodies. Third, 
defense attorneys should engage in community outreach activities to 
garner community support for DMC alleviation efforts. Defense 
attorneys should also seek out community leaders who can testify as 
cultural experts when appropriate. 
 Finally, defense attorneys should exercise their own discretion 
in litigation in a way that brings the race issue firmly into the court’s 
crosshairs. Motions to dismiss in the interest of justice, motions 
raising disparate treatment on the basis of race, and motions 
challenging the reliability of cross-racial eyewitness identification are 
valuable tools for making sure the racial dimensions of cases are not 
ignored. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
  
The experience of black children in the juvenile justice system 
in the wake of both the initial reforms near the turn of the twentieth 
century and the Supreme Court’s Gault–McKeiver line of cases 
demonstrate that the gains from progressive reforms are not distributed 
evenly. When a subjugated group’s narrative becomes overpowered by 
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the narrative espoused by the dominant group, the excluded story 
becomes synonymous with the excluded and oppressed people. 
Suppressing a narrative results in erroneous assumptions becoming 
embedded in doctrine, as the assumption of a benevolent, 
rehabilitative juvenile system became embedded in Gault. This 
structural flaw in the constitutional doctrine itself combined with 
racial bias, excessive discretion in the wrong hands, and the weight of 
history to perpetuate DMC in the juvenile justice system. We cannot 
change history, but we can change the law and direct our behavior to 
promote awareness of bias, to advocate compassion for all children, 
and to ensure that all viewpoints can be heard, acknowledged, and 
taken into account on an equal footing. 
 
